



























Note:  This is a significant update to previous versions dated 
prior to February 7th, mainly due to crediting crew 
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Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)-induced 
SRM catastrophic failure
Ascent debris strikes Orbiter TPS leading 
to LOCV on orbit or entry
MMOD strikes Orbiter on orbit 
leading to LOCV on orbit or entry
Orbiter APU shaft seal fracture on entry SSME-induced SSME uncontained 
failure
Orbiter APU external leak on entry
Orbiter flight software error results in 
catastrophic failure during ascent
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HOW TOP 10 RISKS CHANGE OVER TIME














































































Flight Sequence # Flight Sequence # Flight Sequence #
Flight Sequence # Flight Sequence # Flight Sequence #
Flight Sequence #















































Additional details on top 10 risks for each flight provided in backup

































































































Fuel supply failure to the OMS during 
orbit
Debonding of TPS during ascent SRB booster separation motor debris 
strikes Orbiter windows
MPS FCV poppet failure causes rupture 
in the GH2 re-pressurization line
ABS isolation valve leaks resulting 
loss of all cooling 
SRB APU shaft seal failure Collision of the Orbiter with the ISS during rendezvous and docking
Drops off chart
Model assumes current ISS mission even 
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• MSA-1 ablative material had a flatwise tensile strength of 50 PSI; this was deemed  inadequate.










































































































































Rank % of Total Cumulative Total
Probability
(1/n) Description
















5 3.7 87.9 3.1E‐03
(1:320)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Entry and ejection seats fail to save the crew








8 1.1 93.9 9.0E‐04
(1:1100)
APU external leak on ascent and ejection seats fail to save the crew
9 1.1 95.0 8.8E‐04
(1:1100)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Ascent and ejection seats fail to save the crew


















Description Delta Risk from STS-1





2 38.2 80.7 4.0E‐02
(1:25)
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)‐induced SRM catastrophic failure ↑1:42





4 4.6 90.5 4.9E‐03
(1:210)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure ↑1:1500
5 2.5 93.0 2.6E‐03
(1:380)
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) external leak on entry ↑1:4500
6 1.7 94.7 1.8E‐03
(1:560)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent ↑1:7000
7 1.6 96.3 1.7E‐03
(1:590)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Entry ↓1:710
8 0.9 97.3 9.8E‐04
(1:1000)
APU external leak on ascent ↑1:13000
9 0.8 98.0 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry ↑1:3400



























3 5.7 88.4 5.9E‐03
(1:170)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure ↑1:1000





5 0.7 94.4 1.7E‐03
(1:590)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Entry None





7 1.6 97.7 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
8 0.8 98.5 7.2E‐04
(1:1400)
SSME‐induced benign shutdown of the SSME ↑1:110000
9 0.5 98.9 4.8E‐04
(1:2100)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Ascent None


















































































Description Delta Risk 
from STS-51L











3 5.6 88.1 3.4E‐03
(1:290)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure ↓1:560
4 1.4 89.4 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 1.3 90.7 7.6E‐04
(1:1300)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent ↓1:3400
6 1.1 91.8 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure ↓1:25
7 0.8 92.5 4.7E‐04
(1:2100)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None
8 0.6 93.2 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None
9 0.6 93.7 3.4E‐04
(1:2900)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Entry None


























3 12.2 71.5 3.4E‐03
(1:290)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure None
4 2.9 74.4 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 2.7 77.1 7.6E‐04
(1:1300)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent None
6 2.3 79.5 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
7 1.6 81.1 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit ↓1:41000
8 1.3 82.4 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None
9 1.2 83.6 3.4E‐04
(1:2900)
Orbiter APU Shaft Seal Fracture Entry None




























3 12.5 73.6 3.4E‐03
(1:290)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME uncontained failure None
4 3.0 76.6 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 2.4 79.0 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
6 1.8 80.9 5.0E‐04
(1:2000)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent ↓1:3900
7 1.7 82.5 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None
8 1.4 83.9 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None
9 0.9 84.7 2.3E‐04
(1:4300)
SRB booster separation motor debris strikes Orbiter windows None































4 3.1 76.6 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None





6 1.7 80.8 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None





8 1.4 83.7 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None




































4 1.7 89.2 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None





6 0.9 91.5 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None
7 0.8 92.3 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None





9 0.5 93.4 2.3E‐04
(1:4300)
SRB booster separation motor debris strikes Orbiter windows None





























3 3.1 87.2 1.5E‐03
(1:680)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure ↓1:840
4 1.8 88.9 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 1.4 90.3 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
6 1.0 91.3 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None
7 0.8 92.1 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None
8 0.7 92.8 3.2E‐04
(1:3100)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent None































3 6.9 69.5 1.5E‐03
(1:680)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure None
4 3.9 73.3 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 3.1 76.4 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
6 2.1 78.6 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit None
7 1.7 80.3 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None
8 1.4 81.7 3.0E‐04
(1:3400)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent ↓1:48000
































3 7.8 70.5 1.6E‐03
(1:610)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure ↑1:5600
4 3.9 74.4 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 3.1 77.5 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
6 2.1 79.6 4.5E‐04
(1:2200)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS None
7 1.7 81.3 3.7E‐04
(1:2700)
Debonding of TPS during ascent None







































3 12.0 61.4 1.6E‐03
(1:610)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)‐induced SSME catastrophic failure None
4 6.0 67.3 8.2E‐04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry None
5 4.8 72.1 6.5E‐04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)‐induced RSRM catastrophic failure None
6 1.6 73.8 2.3E‐04
(1:4400)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during ascent ↓1:29000






8 1.2 76.3 1.7E‐04
(1:5900)
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) APU shaft seal fracture None
9 1.1 77.4 1.5E‐04
(1:6500)
SRB booster separation motor debris strikes Orbiter windows None



























































































































































































































with 1 in 
113
1:365
Note:  average of 1:220 is consistent with previously calculated 
Pre-RTF value of 1:241 which is documented in iteration 3.2.
Note:  average of 1:120 is consistent with previously calculated 







Mission 96, STS-103, ET-101 was the first 
mission with venting holes on  ET TPS
• Prior to ET-88 (STS-86) the average number of hits to the lower surface >1 inch was ~13, from ET-88 to ET-100 
(STS-96) the average is ~45.  Once the ET is vent the averages drops back down to ~16.
• There does not appear to be a significant difference between LWT and SLWT with regard to lower surface 
damages
- Graph starts at ET-62 because ET start date was unavailable prior to ET-62, however damage trend is similar prior to ET-
62 and post return to flight after Challenger (with the exception of STS-27 which had significant damage due to SRB 
nose cap TPS debris)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 0.8 10.2 9.1E‐05
(1:11000)
Common cause failure of the APU System on entry














































Note:  … means it is equal to SPRA iteration 3.3
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
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